We address the problem of supporting empir ical probabilities in monadic logic databases. Though the semantics of multivalued logic programs has been studied extensively, the treatment of probabilities as results of sta tistical findings has not been studied in logic programming/deductive databases. We de velop a model-theoretic characterization of logic databases that facilitates such a treat ment. We present an algorithm for checking consistency of such databases and prove its total correctness . We develop a sound and complete query process ing procedure for han dling queries to such databases. The main aim of this paper is to capture this kind of empirical reasoning within the framework of deduc tive databases. The knowledge about specific individ uals in the sample is two-valued true/false knowledge. This knowledge is represented as a set of ordinary first order logic clauses called the context. The probabil ities derived from the sample are expresse d as condi tional probability statements and constitute the empir ical component of our knowledge. These probabilities may then he used to induce information about objects not in the context (sample), but in the population. As we are studying only individuals and their prop erties, rather than the relationships between individ uals, these properties are represented using unary (or monadic) predicates.
Introduction
During the past decade, there has been growing in terest in reasoning with uncertainty in logic program ming, deductive databases and expert systems. The semantics of logic programs based on uncertainty has been studied by van Emden [20] , Blair and Subrah manian [5] , Dubois et al. [6] , Kifer et. al. [11] and Fitting [8] . All these studies were based upon non probabilistic modes of uncertainty. The fi rst seman tical characterizations of probabilistic logic program ming were those of Ng and Subrahmanian [13, 14] .
These characterizations were based on subjective prob abilities using a Kripke-style possible-worlds semantics along the lines of the work by Nilsson [16] .
While subjective probabilities view probabilities as de grees of belief, empirical probabilities represent ob jective, statistical truths about the world/population. Typically, empirical probabilities are obtained from samples of individuals in the population. These sam ples can then used to inductively infer probabilities about the entire population. For example, if 500 monk seals are physically caught (in some unbiased way), these 500 monk seals constitute the sample in ques tion. Inductive reasoning allows us to draw conclusions about a specific monk seal that is not in the sample.
The main aim of this paper is to capture this kind of empirical reasoning within the framework of deduc tive databases. The knowledge about specific individ uals in the sample is two-valued true/false knowledge. This knowledge is represented as a set of ordinary first order logic clauses called the context. The probabil ities derived from the sample are expresse d as condi tional probability statements and constitute the empir ical component of our knowledge. These probabilities may then he used to induce information about objects not in the context (sample), but in the population. As we are studying only individuals and their prop erties, rather than the relationships between individ uals, these properties are represented using unary (or monadic) predicates.
The first contribution of this paper is the development of a formal model-theoretic basis for such databases. This task is complicated by the fact that Herbrand in terpretations are not rich enough to capture the intu itions behind empirical probabilities (cf. Example 2).
The second contribution is the development of sound and complete algorithms for determining the consis tency of such databases. These algorithms are based on constraint satisfaction techniques, and hence, may be implemented using standard mixed integer linear programming algorithms. The third contribution is a procedure to answer queries to such databases. This procedure first tries to deduce a definite answer from the context, and if that is not poss ible, it tries to in duce answers from the empirical component. This pro cedure is sound and complete.
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Empirical Programs
Let C be a language generated by finitely many unary predicate symbols, but no function symbols. We now proceed to define empirical clauses. A fea ture of these clauses is that "complex properties" are embodied syntactically by the notion defined below. rather, it is a statement about a "generic" individual X in the domain of discourse.
In class ical logic, the clause A(X) -(B(X) V C(X)) can be represented by the two clauses: A(X)-B(X) and A(X)-C(X). Similarly, A(X) AB(X)-C(X) is equivalent to the conjunction of the clauses A( X) -C(X) and B(X) -C(X). One may wonder whether such an equivalence is true for empirical clauses; if so, complex predicate symbols can be dispensed with.
In [15) , we show that this is not always poss ible, and thus, the presence of complex predicate symbols makes empirical clauses more express ive than those without complex symbols.
Example 1 Consider the empirical program {C, E) where E consists of the following clauses:
The first clause states that at most 10% of "Royal_elephants" are "Grey." The last two clauses describe the relative percentages of "Elephants" and "Grey" individuals. In particular, they state that be tween 90% and 95% of all "Elephants" are "Grey," whereas only between 10% and 20% of "Grey" indi viduals are "Elephants." Finally, let the context C consist of the following clauses:
The second clause states that for this particular con text, every individual is either "Grey" or "White." 0
3
Model Theoretic Semantics
Interpretations and Models
For our language C, the notion of an interpretation is almost identical to the usual one for first-order lan guages -except for two differences. The first one is that interpretations I are ass umed to map different constant symbols in C to distinct elements in the do main of I. The second difference is that the domain of I is ass umed to be finite. There are two reasons for this ass umption. The first one is that empirical programs are intended to reflect findings from statisti cal samples which are always finite. The other reason, which is more technical, will be apparent in a later defi nition on satisfaction ( cf. Definition 4).
In conventional logic programming, it suffices to use Her brand interpretations. However, the following ex ample shows that when dealing with empirical proba bilities, using only Herbrand interpretations and uni verses may not make sense at all.
Example 2 Consider the following empirical pro gram:
The empirical clause states that between 40% and 45% of a.ll "Monk....se als " are "Females. " The con text part consists only of the single fact that joe is a "Monk....se al. " But note that the Herbrand uni verse is the singleton {joe}. Since there is only 1 member in this set, what then is the meaning of the statement that between 40% and 45% of all "Monk ...s eals" are "Females"? In particular, there are two poss ible Herbrand interpretations that will satisfy the second clause, namely {Monk_seal(joe)} and {Monl:...s eal(joe), Female(joe)}. In both cases, Female(joe) is either true or false. With only these two interpretations, it is unclear how they can "sat isfy" the first clause in an empirical sense.
0
As the above example shows, considering Herbrand interpretations alone may fail to capture the empiri cal nature of probabilistic reasoning. Hence, in order to discuss arbitrary domains, we also consider non Herbrand interpretations. We will define shortly when an interpretation satisfies an empirical program. In the sequel, given a predicate symbol A and an inter pretation I with domain D, we use the notation Ar to denote the set {d E D I ¢A(d) = true }, where I maps the predicate symbol A to the mapping ¢A· We extend this notation to complex predicate sym bols: (F1AF2)I to mean (FllnF21), and (Ft V F2)I to mean (FllUF21), where F1, F2 are two complex predicate symbols. We also use the notation IIF1A ... AFnllr to denote the cardinality of the set F 11 n ... n Fn r· Intuitively, IIF 1 A ... A Fn llr denotes "the number of individuals in the domain of I that have properties Ft, ... , Fn." Before we define the notion of satisfac tion, recall that an empirical program consists of a context C and a set E of empirical clauses. Given the nature of C, we say that I satisfies C iff I satis fies every clause in C in the usual sense, for first-order languages. Thus, we only need to define the condition for I to satisfy the set E of empirical clauses.
Definition 4 Let (C, E) be an empirical program and I be an interpretation. 1) We say that I satisfies the empirical clause
We say that I satisfies E iff I satisfies every em pirical clause in E. Finally, I satisfies the empirical program (C, E) iff I satisfies both C and E. 0 Example 3 Consider the empirical program in Ex ample 2. Let I be the interpretation defined as fol lows. Firstly, the domain of I is the set {dt. ... , d2o}, for some individuals dt, ... , d20• Secondly, I ass igns to the constant symbol joe, the element d5. Furthemore, I ass igns to the predicate symbol Monk...s eal, the map ping 11 such that ft(d;) = true for all 1 :$ i :$ 10, and ft(d;) = false for all 11 $ i :$ 20. Finally, I ass igns to the predicate symbol Female, the mapping /2 such that h(d;) = true for all 1 $ i $ 4, and ft(d;) =false for all 5 $ i :$ 20. Then, it is straightforward to check that I is a model of the program.
Recall that the intuitive meaning of an empirical clause
given that an arbitrary individual X has (complex) properties F1, ... , Fn, the conditional probability that X also has property F falls within the range [c1, c2)." According to probability theory, the statement can be represented . • Num(S) denotes the cardinality of the set S. This is the intuition behind Definition 4 for an interpretation to satisfy an empirical clause.
Finally, recall that an interpretation I for C has a finite domain. A technical reason for this restriction is that then the ratio �;;� �-·.:;;:\ 1 is always well-defined and is between 0 and 1, whenever IIFtA ... AFnll r > 0.
Consistency of Empirical Programs with Empty Contexts
Let {A t, ... , A1:} be the set of all predicate symbols in C. Furthermore, suppose that all poss ible sub sets of { A1, ... , Ai:} are enumerated in an arbitrary, but fixed way:
Vi be an integer variable that intuitively denotes the number of individuals in an underlying domain that have the complex property: 1\Ae'P; A 1\ A t.'P ; -.A. It is easy to see that the 'Pt's divide the set of all indi viduals into 2 • partitions. Thus, given the v; 's, the number of individuals that have an arbitrary property F can also be determined. This amounts to check ing whether for all 1 $ i $ 2 • , F is true in each 'P; -in the class ical 2-valued Herbrand sense. We often abuse notation by regarding F as a proposition and write 'Pi F F whenever F is true in 'P;. 
The first partition corresponds to individuals hav ing the properties "Monk..seal" and "Female," and so on. Now, since the property "Monk..seal" is true in the class ical 2-valued Herbrand sense in 1'1 E {Monk..seal, Female} and 1'2 = {Monk..seal}, the number of individuals having the property "Monk..seal" is given by (tit+ v2).
0
Definition 5 Let E be a set of empirical clauses.
be an empirical clause. The constraint version of Cl, denoted by con(Cl), is the constraint:
2) Let con(E) denote the set {con(Cl) I Cl E E} U 2 .
u:: ,=l v , � 1 1.
o
The reason why we study con( E) is that we intend to check the consistency of E based on the constraints in con(E). More specifically, if I is a model of E, and if n; denotes the number of individuals in the domain of I corresponding to 'P; for all 1 $ i < 2 1: , then the ass ignment v; = n; for all 1 $ i $ 2 "I represents a solution to the constraints in con(E). Furthermore, the constraint E�:l v; � 1 in con(E) guarantees that if I is model of E, the domain of I must be non-empty.
While the details of this discussion will be formalized shortly, fi rst consider the following example. Theorem 1 Let I be an interpretation a.nd E be a set of empirical clauses. I is a model of E iff Sr is a solution of con(E).
D
The above theorem suggests a practical way to check the consistency of a set E of empirical clauses. This amounts to checking whether con(E) bas an integer solution. As all the constraints are linear 1 , checking whether con( E) has a solution can be carried out by an integer linear programming algorithm. One advantage of viewing consistency checking as constraint satisfac tion is that implementations of such algorithms are widely av ailable, such as the LINDO package running on the IBM/PC.
Consistency of Empirical Programs
Given an empirical program {C, E), recall from Defi nition 4 that an interpretation I is a model of the pro gram iff I satisfi es both C and E. Theorem 1 above suggests a way to check the consistency of the E part of the program. Moreover, there are certainly many ways to check the consistency of the C part, such as using the implementation described in [4) . Obviously, the problem is that the consistency of C and E, when con sidered separately, does not guarantee the joint consis tency of (C, E). One straightforward solution to this problem is to find a model for the C part and then test for satisfaction of the E part using Theorem 1. How ever, if {C, E) is jointl y inconsistent, this strategy may not terminate, as C may hav e infi nitely many models.
In the following, we present a terminating procedure that decides the consistency of an empirical program.
Algorithm 1 Let the input be an empirical program
{C,E).
Parti tion the clauses in C into two sets C1 1 C2
such that C1 consists of all non-ground clauses in
Ln(X) is a clause in C}), and C2 = C-Ct.
2. By Defi nition 1, every clause in C2 is ground.
Find all Herbrand models of C2 using techniques such as the one described in [4).
If no such Herbrand model can be found, declare
that the program is inconsistent and halt.
4.
Otherwise, let { M1, ... , Mu} be the set of Her brand models of C2 computed in Step 2. Set i to 1.
5.
If j > u, declare that the empirical program is inconsistent and halt.
6. Initialize the set T to con(E). • Compute the number nA which is the cardi nality of the set {A( c) I A( c) E Mj for some constant symbol c}. Then add the constraint: (L'P; I=A Vi ?: nA) to T.
For each clause Cl
• Similarly, compute the number iiA which is the cardinality of the set {-.A( c) I A( c) ¢ Mj for some constant symbol c}. Then add the constraint: (Lp, j;;; -. A Vi ?: iiA) to T. It is easy to verify that these constraints are satisfiable.
For instance, one solution is: v1 = 4, v2 = 6 and vs, t14
equal to any non-negative integers. Thus, this program is consistent; for instance, the intepretation given in
Example 3 is a model.
0
The above example highlights the major difference be tween the current fra mework for empirical probabili ties and the earlier formalisms we proposed for subjec tive probabilities [13, 14] . In those formalisms, a clause corresp onding in appearance to an emprical clause applies to every individual in the Herbrand domain.
Thus, the subjective probability of Female(joe) is si multaneously 0 due to -.F emale(ioe), and between 0.4 and 0.45 due to the clause in E. This gives rise to an inconsistency. Thus, this program is inconsistent in the formalisms in [13, 14] . 4 
Query Processing for Consistent Empirical Programs
4.1
Outline fo r Query Answering
A query to an empirical program is of the form: Q = F(d) which intuitively <\Sks for the conditional probability of constant d having (complex) property F,
given that the program is true. As a preview, we first outline below a two-step procedure that can be used to answer this query; the procedure will be form alized in Section 4.3.
In the fi rst step, the query answering procedure poses the query against the context C. If the context can deduce the truth or falsity of the query, then the pro cedure returns the answer 1 or 0 respectively, and the process ing for the query is completed. Otherwise, the procedure moves to the second stage.
When no defi nite answer to the query can be de duced, the procedure then tries to induce the condi tional probability by consulting the empirical clauses in E. More sp ecifically, given the properties posses se d by d, the procedure poses the query F(X) to the em pirical clauses. As we argued before, the X here should not be taken as a quantifi er; rather, it represents a generic random individual in the domain.
Example 7 Consider the program discussed in Ex ample 1. Suppose the query is Qt = Elephant(clyde).
Then, using the first and third clauses, it is easy to see that, given the context, the conditional probabil ity of Elephant(clyde) is 1. Now consider the query Q2 :::; Grey(clyde). No definite answer for Q2 can be deduced from the context. Thus, the query Grey(X)
is posed to the empirical clauses. The first two empir ical clauses may be used to induce information about clyde because clyde is known, from the context, to be both an "Elephant" and a "RoyaLelephant."
0
The query Q2 in the above example underlines a ma jor issue involved in such inductive answering -the choice of answers when more than one inductive an swer is poss ible. The approach we take to resolve such conflicts is the one customarily used in statistical in ferences -choose the one with the most specific refer ence class . In the following, before we formalize our query answering procedure, we first discuss how empir ical programs can be compiled to facilitate the choice of reference classes and the corresponding empirical clauses.
Unfolding and Chaining of Empirical Programs
The unfolding procedure below computes the set of implications that are needed in query answering to de termine the preferences of clauses.
Algorithm 2 Let C be the context of an empirical program.
1. Set S to be the set of all complex predicate sym bols in C. Set C' to be the set of all non ground clauses in C, i.e. C'
Recall that there are only finitely many predicate sym bols in C. Thus, in [15] , we show that the set S de scribed in Algorithm 2 must be finite. Hence, the algo rithm always terminates, yielding a finite set impl(C).
Algorithm 2 is not the only optimization that can be carried out in compiling a program. Another one is chaining that can be computed by the following algo rithm. The purpose of chaining clauses is to ensure that our query answering procedure ( cf. Algorithm 4 below ) is complete (cf. Theorem 4). In the sequel, the symbols F1. F2, F3 and F4 are ass umed to be distinct complex predicate symbols.
Algorithm 3 Let EP = (C, E) be an empirical pro gram.
1. Use Algorithm 2 to compute the set impl(C).
Set
To to E, and i to 1. 8. Set 1i = Ta-t USt US2US3US4US5. 1£11 is the same as 11-t, then set comp(EP) ={imp/( C), 11) and halt.
9.
Otherwise, increment i and go to Step 3. Recall from Section 4.1 that inductive answering in volves choosing the most specific reference class . How ever, in general, as reference classes may only follow a partial order in specificity, there may not be a unique most specific reference class ; rather, there may only be several maximally specific reference classes. The following definition deals with this situation. 
Related Work
Our framework was inspired, in part, by Bacchus' framework that extends full first order logic with em pirical probability statements. He develops a sound and complete proof procedure for consistent theo ries, but does not provide a consistency check mecha nism. We provide explicit mechanisms for determining the consistency of empirical programs. These mecha nisms are based upon mixed integer linear program ming techniques and hence, may be implemented on top of standard integer programming packages. They are guaranteed to terminate. Both Bacchus [2] and our framework use the concept of inductive answering. FUrthermore, we provide compilation techniques that facilitate process ing of queries that require inductive (and deductive) answering.
The integration of logic and probability theory bas been the subject of numerous studies [7, 10, 16, 18] . Fagin, Halpern and Meggido [7] have proposed a model-theoretic basis for reasoning about systems of linear inequalities of probabilities. Their proposal is based on the poss ible-world approach, and hence is different from the empirical approach considered here. Kavvadias and Papadimitriou [10] have studied the consistency of probabilistic logic programs using lin ear programming. However, their study is based on Nilsson's poss ible worlds semantics, i.e. the linear pro grams specify constraints on the probability distribu tions over the set of poss ible worlds (which is identical to the set of Herbrand interpretations). On the other hand, the linear programs in our framework specify constraints over the domain of an interpretation, which may or may not be an Herbrand interpretation. 6 
Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a model-theoretic foundation for logic programming that supports empirical proba bilities and allows inductive probabilistic reasoning to be performed. To capture the intuitions behind empir ical probabilities, our model theory also considers non Herbrand interpretations. Furthermore, we develop a totally correct algorithm for verifying the consistency of monadic deductive databases. This algorithm can be implemented using mixed integer linear program ming algorithms. Finally, for dealing with queries to such databases, we develop a sound and complete pro cedure that uses deductive and inductive answering. We also devise compilation techniques to facilitate this procedure.
